ABSTRACT This paper focuses on the data-driven optimal attack strategy against state estimation in cyber-physical systems (CPSs). Different from the research on attack strategies of specific attack types, the proposed attack strategy addresses the optimal selection of attacked targets, which can combine with different attack types and produce greater threats to CPS. In particular, a causality analysis (CA) on the measurement data is first proposed to evaluate the significance of nodes (sensor groups) and help the implementation of the optimal node attack, since the system topology and parameters are not available to adversaries. On the one hand, a multivariate transfer entropy and several data preprocessing methods are employed to complete the CA between sensor groups qualitatively. On the other hand, three new indexes, e.g., driver degree, are defined to complete the CA quantitatively. Moreover, the theoretical basis for the proposed node attack is provided, in which the superiority of the node attack is proven from the view of observability. Finally, the case studies on the smart grid are illustrated to verify the superiority of the proposed attack strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, due to the frequent industrial security contingencies in cyber-physical systems (CPS) (such as smart grids and other industrial control systems [1] , [2] ), the security problems induced by malicious cyber attacks in CPS have received wide attention [2] - [6] . The main research on these security problems can be divided into four categories: attack strategies [1] , [7] , self-protection of systems [8] , attack detection and identification [2] , [9] , [10] , and design of resilience state estimators and controllers [3] - [5] , [11] . Note that the last three categories represent countermeasures against different attack strategies. Therefore, studies on the possible attack behaviors of adversaries are meaningful, can provide a basis for defense countermeasure research and are helpful to reduce the impact of attacks.
A substantial amount of research has addressed strategies for specific types of attacks in CPS. For example, denial of service (DoS) attacks and a variety of distributed or centralized deception attacks, including Markov-modulated DoS [12] attack, DoS attack with specific frequency and duration [13] , energy-constrained DoS attacks [7] , [14] , false data injection attacks (FDIAs) [1] and replay attacks [4] . Some scholars have focused on the limited energy of adversaries and the defense facilities in CPS; therefore, the duration, frequency and sparsity of attacks have been considered in the design of attack strategies. However, attacks with specific frequency and duration are designed under the assumption that the attack targets are determined or randomly selected. Moreover, the sparse attacks are always randomly sparse in space as long as their sparsity meets the stealth requirement and energy constraints or other constraints. Different from the scholars above, we focus on not only the adversary's energy constraints but also the selection of optimal attacked targets in complex CPS. Relative to the type of attacks, the selection of attack targets is more important. If the attacks are launched on the unimportant targets (data), no matter how devastating the attack type is, the impact on the system may be ignored. In addition, the proposed attack strategy can be combined with most of the attack types above, which poses a greater threat to CPS.
The significance evaluation of all candidate targets (data) is the most critical work in our proposed attack strategy, representing the first step of the attack for adversaries. Such evaluation has been studied in multiple complex networks, such as social networks (including information dissemination or epidemic spreading) [15] and CPS. In particular, the significance evaluation has been used in industrial CPS to analyze the vulnerability of the system and further complete fault diagnosis by system maintainers [16] - [18] in the past few years. With the topology and parameters of CPS, the system maintainers can adopt various methods to evaluate the significance of measurements or devices to complete analyses of contingencies or cascading events, such as the cascading fault graph on graph theory [16] , probabilistic and deterministic methods with the analyses of static and dynamic performances [17] , and global and local sensitivity analysis [18] . However, the evaluation methods described above are applied based on the known system topology and parameters by the maintainers, which are invalid since the system information is not available to adversaries.
To become more powerful or intelligent, on the one hand, adversaries are bound to make full use of the acquired measurement data and launch effective attacks; therefore, a new data-driven evaluation method based on causality analysis (CA) is presented to identify the optimal attacked targets in the proposed attack. The CA method that includes Granger causality (GC) and transfer entropy (TE) is a data-driven statistical tool to explore the driver-target relationship between variables [19] . The method has been widely applied to the fields of neuroscience [20] and fault diagnosis in some industrial processes [21] , [22] . In [19] , the equivalence between the GC and TE was proven under Gaussian assumption of the data. However, in contrast to GC, TE can be applied to the data analysis under the assumptions of linear and nonlinear bi-variables and, in particular, multiple variables. Therefore, TE is employed to complete the calculation of CA. On the other hand, it is better to avoid launching the attacks hastily, instead, the attacks should be ingeniously designed to degrade the system slowly and maintain self-stealthiness or attack the most critical targets quickly and accurately before the effective defense from system. In this paper, we choose the latter strategy. Therefore, instead of contaminating all measurement data, the adversaries in this paper tend to launch the optimized target attack rather than random target attack and full-target attack due to the greater collapsing force and lower cost of the optimized target attack.
In summary, this paper contains three main contributions: 1) Without the system topology and parameters, a new data-driven node attack based on causality analysis (CA) against state estimation is proposed, which can be combined with most attack types (such as DoS) and produce a greater threat than random (DoS) attack. To our knowledge, this is the first time that CA is applied to launch cyber-attacks by adversaries.
2) Three new indexes based on transfer entropy are defined to complete the CA of measurement data, which helps adversaries evaluate the significance of nodes or measurement data in complex CPS such as a smart grid. In addition, to reduce the computational burden and improve the accuracy of causality analyses, several improvements for the proposed CA are completed. In particular, the CA of sensor groups is developed further for the optimal node attack.
3) Relative to the data attack, the superiority of the node attack is proven from the view of observability, which provides the theoretical basis for the optimal node attack.
In this paper, the proposed attack strategy is applied to a smart grid that is a typical complex industrial CPS (ICPS). The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, preliminaries and the problem formulation are presented, including the introduction of the power system model and employed state estimator. Data-driven attacks on causality analysis are described in Section III, representing our main work, including the causality analysis on transfer entropy in Section III-A, the ranking of nodes based on three new indexes in Section III-B, node attack in Section III-C, and the implementation of the optimal node attack in Section III-D. In Section IV, 5 cases under two attack modes in the smart grid are studied, including the selection of optimal attacked targets in Section IV-A and state estimation under the combination of the two attack modes and DoS in Section IV-B; another, larger power system is used to verify the proposed attack in Section IV-C. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section V.
Notation. ln(·) denotes the natural logarithm function; cov(a, b) denotes the cross-covariance matrix of vectors a and b, corresponding to the covariance matrix when a = b; sgn (·) is the sign function of the variable ·; p (·) is the joint probability of the vector ·; p(· | ·) denotes the conditional probability;  denotes the imaginary unit.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
The smart grid integrated with a large amount of information and communication technology is a typical ICPS [1] , [2] . In this paper, the proposed attack strategy is launched to the smart grid to verify the effect of the cyber attack on state estimation (SE), which can lead to un-received or corrupted measurement data for the state estimator in energy management system (EMS) and an erroneous control decision that could destroy the physical system.
A. SYSTEM MODEL AND STATE ESTIMATOR
In general, to simplify the analyses and accelerate the calculations, a DC approximation model (linear measurement model) is adopted in the power grid:
where z ∈ m denotes the power measurement data, which may be the real power P i injection at node i or the real power VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 1. Security risk from cyber attacks in the smart grid.
flow P ij on branch line i − j. x = θ ∈ n only denotes the voltage phase angles, and H is a measurement Jacobian matrix. υ is the measurement noise. Details regarding (1) are described in [23] .
We assume that J (x) denotes the objective function of the SE,x ∈ n denotes the estimated state vector and R is the covariance matrix of the noise υ. Thus, the weighted least square (WLS) method [23] based on (1) is adopted as follows:
B. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In the smart grid, to ensure the observability of the system, sufficient measurement data should be collected by the state estimator in EMS. However, due to the high integration of communication and information technologies in the smart grid, the transmission of data may be vulnerable to malicious cyber attacks. The security risk regarding cyber attacks in the smart grid is shown in Fig.1 . According to Fig.1 , the result of the state estimator is a basis for economic dispatch, optimal power flow, contingency analysis and so on, which offers the key information for the operator to make the correct control decision and then drive the actuators. Clearly, the security of the cyber system directly or indirectly affects the physical system in the smart grid. In this paper, we only discuss the impact of attacks on state estimation to verify the effect of the proposed attack, not on the transmitted control data u. Fortunately, the implementation of cyber attacks is always challenging due to the limited ability of general adversaries, such as opportunistic attackers. In this paper, we make the following assumption about the initial abilities of adversaries:
Assumption 1: The topology information and parameters of the system are not available for adversaries, due to their limited resources (e.g., they are not the insiders of the system) or the protection facilities of the system. The standardized communication protocol is always adopted in the smart grid that offers a greater opportunity for adversaries to invade. Therefore, for adversaries, measurement data can be acquired through the communication network during the transmission of the data. Generally, adversaries have the following abilities:
1) Eavesdropping and intercepting all measurement data passing through the communication network. 2) Storing the data that are intercepted or constructed.
3) Sending the data that are intercepted or constructed. Assumption 1) ensures the acquisition of measurement data, which is a basis for the construction of the proposed attacks. Assumption 2) provides a strong guarantee for the analysis of measurement data, and Assumption 3) ensures the implementation of the proposed attacks. Note that the abilities of adversaries can be improved through the full analysis and utilization of the measurement data. According to [24] , the attacks launched by such adversaries (Assumption 1) can be described as a blind attack. To improve the abilities of adversaries and make them more intelligent, how to construct such a blind attack on measurement data is the main aim of the paper. To achieve this aim, CA is introduced to complete the information mining of the measurement data and help adversaries to launch the blind attack.
In the proposed blind attack (i.e., data-driven and intentional attack), the selection of optimal attacked targets rather than the design of specific attack types (e.g., the stealthy DoS or FDIAs or replay attacks) is our main work. Thus, how to find the most critical targets in the grid and design the optimized target attack based on intercepted measurement data? Clearly, the most critical targets should be evaluated according to their significance in the grid. Therefore, New indexes for the significant evaluation are needed in the proposed data-driven attack.
Remark 1: According to the literature review, the corrupted measurement data detected by bad data detection (BDD) and identification can be always processed in the following ways: a) The corrupted measurement data may be discarded after an effective method for BDD and identification, if the observability of the system based on the remaining measurements can be guaranteed; b) The corrupted measurement data can be replaced by the last available (clean) measurement data, however, the error of the SE will increase with the holding of the malicious behavior; c) Once the presence of attacks is detected, the true state may be reconstructed by some valid methods [25] that need the accurate state model, however, the accurate state model is not easy to be built and always the approximate linear model. Therefore, SE always adopts way b) to keep the observability of the system in a short time. To simplify our analysis and highlight our focus, based on the above remark, the worst scenario is what we consider: the attack can be detected but not effectively and quickly defended, omitting the specific detection method. In this scenario, the corrupted measurement data can only be discarded or replaced by historical and clean data by SE. If the fast and accurate attack succeeds, the error of the SE or failure of critical components should propagate to the entire power CPS and then lead to major accident in the power grid [26] . Generally, the fast and accurate attack means attacking on the most critical targets before the implementation of effective defense methods.
In the next section, we present the proposed data-driven attack, where our main work focuses on the node attack; the reason for this work is also given.
III. DATA-DRIVEN ATTACKS ON CAUSALITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the main purpose is to find the most critical attacked targets in the smart grid. However, since the adversaries do not have the topology information and parameters of the system, many evaluation methods based on system topology and parameters [16] - [18] cannot be applied. Therefore, a new evaluation method based on the causality analysis for measurement data is proposed.
A. CAUSALITY ANALYSIS ON TRANSFER ENTROPY
In the smart grid, the significance of the measurement data depends on the influence on other measurements, which is similar to the idea in CA [19] . Specifically, if the change in one measurement value can cause a change in another one, the former should be the driver, and the latter is the responder (target) in bivariate CA. Clearly, CA is a data-driven and directional influence analysis method, which includes Granger causality (GC) and transfer entropy (TE) [21] . Relative to GC, TE has wider application on data analysis for both linear and nonlinear time series, which has been developed for multivariate analysis ( [27] and its references) that considers the interaction of the grid data more comprehensively.
Supposing that there are m measurements in the grid, we are interested in estimating the information transferred from source variable z i to destination variable z j under the remaining measurement variables in the vector
as the vectors that represent the historical data of z i , z j and Z before the sampling time t 0 , respectively. t 0 + τ is the prediction sampling time point. Thus, the multivariate TE from z i to z j under condition variable Z is described as follows:
According to (3), the future information of z [22] , [27] . According to [19] , the TE in (3) can be expressed as follows in the form of Shannon entropies (se):
Clearly, the design of the entropy estimator is a key step for calculation of the TE. To simplify CA and then improve the efficiency of attacks, a linear entropy estimator is introduced to calculate the se in (4), following the assumption that all measurement variables have a joint Gaussian distribution. The corresponding linear regression model is presented as follows:
where A (1) and A (2) are the corresponding linear regression coefficients of (5) and (6), respectively. ε (1) and ε (2) are random residual vectors whose covariances can be expressed as cov ε (1) and cov ε (2) , respectively. We have the following equations according to [19] :
Therefore, (4) can be represented as follows:
According to (8) , if model (6), including the vector z i− t 0 , can reduce the prediction error for z j relative to model (5), namely, cov ε (2) < cov ε (1) , then the TE value z i →z j |Z will become larger. Thus, we can draw a conclusion that z i is probably the driver of the target z j and that the probability depends on the TE value. 
, where l is the embedding dimension for z i− t 0 and h is embedding time interval. The historical data are collected uniformly to complete the reconstruction, leading to large storage requirements and calculation burden. Instead, nonuniform embedding (NUE) is presented to complete the reconstruction in the paper, in which the historical data z i− t 0 are selected according to the maximum mutual information between the data and the target time series from the set
The details of NUE are omitted in this paper, as they were stated in [27] and [28] . Similarly, z j− t 0 and Z − t 0 are also reconstructed by the NUE.
B. RANKING OF NODES BASED ON THREE NEW INDEXES
According to (8) , the causalities for all of measurement variables can be determined, which provides a new way for adversaries to evaluate the significance of each measurement variable when the adversaries are blind to the topology and VOLUME 7, 2019 parameters of the system. To evaluate this approach quantitatively, we have the following definitions:
Definition 1: Driver Degree (DD): as the drivers in all of causalities, the DD value for the measurement z i is defined as follows:
where z i → is the corresponding sum of transfer entropy (TE) values z i →z j |Z ( z i →z j |Z ≥ 0). Here, z i →z j |Z > 0 denotes z i is a driver of the target z j , while z i →z j |Z = 0 denotes z i is not a driver of the target z j . Clearly, DD denotes the relative TE values of z i as the drivers in all of causalities, and can be used to quantitatively evaluate the relative significance of z i in the whole grid. Therefore, the higher DD value of z i , the more significant it is, and vice versa. It should be noted that i and j are just the number allocation of intercepted measurement data or data set by adversaries, not the true number allocation set by system defenders, since the number allocation can help adversaries identify different data or data set. Such note also applies to the following definitions.
Definition 2: Target Degree (TD): as the targets in all of causalities, the TD value for the measurement z i is defined as follows
where →z i is the corresponding sum of transfer entropy (TE) values z j →z i |Z ( z j →z i |Z ≥ 0). Here, z j →z i |Z > 0 denotes z i is a target of the driver z j , while z j →z i |Z = 0 denotes z i is not a target of the driver z j . Clearly, TD denotes the relative TE values of z i as the targets in all of causalities, and can be used to quantitatively evaluate the relative significance of z i in the whole grid. Therefore, the higher TD value of z i , the more significant it is, and vice versa. Clearly, 0 ≤ DD ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ TD ≤ 1. Definition 3: Degree: the Degree value of the measurement z i based on TE in all causalities is defined as follows:
Remark 2: Note that the DD, TD and Degree of the measurement in the above definitions are different from but really inspired by the definitions of out-degree, in-degree and degree based on the system topology in graph theory [29] . The first difference between the two kinds of definitions is as follows: the former definitions are based on TE values in all causalities, but the latter definitions are on the known topology of the directed graph, corresponding to the number of edges connected to the vertex and the directions. Therefore, the former definitions in this paper reflect not only the connection situation but also the level of the mutual influence. In addition, in the complex grid such as the power grid, the out-degree, in-degree and degree of nodes cannot indicate the complex interrelationship, which neglect the internal electrical characteristics and possible loops (feedback is common).
Remark 3: In any grid, the number of measurement data points is much larger than that of nodes (vertexes), particularly in the large-scale power grid. Hence, the calculation burden of (8) for all measurement data (sensors) is enormous, which has been mentioned by other scholars but remains unsolved [10] , [22] . Therefore, a new approach with a lower computational burden for CA is needed, such as CA for sensor groups. Inspired by the degree of the vertex in graph theory, CA based on nodes is proposed in this paper to reduce the computational burden, in which the measurement data from sensors connected to each node are pre-fused before the CA.
1) CAUSALITY ANALYSIS OF SENSOR GROUPS
For each node, the power flows from and to the node reflect the interaction with other nodes. Moreover, the scale of power flows reflects the extent of the interaction, namely, power throughput. Therefore, the total power throughput of each node can also be used to reflect the interaction between nodes, which is obtained by the following simple data fusion: (12) where S = P +  Q denotes the complex power, including the real power P and reactive power Q, and S i flow denotes the total complex power flow of node i. If the SE is based on a DC model (1), equation (12) can be simplified as the total real power flow of node i.
Remark 4: According to (12), the total power flow data for each node can be considered as the data from a sensor group installed at the corresponding node. Thus, the causality of nodes (sensor groups) can be analyzed with the lower calculation burden instead of the CA of measurement data directly from sensors. Therefore, we can evaluate the significance for each node instead of the significance for each measurement variable through (9), (10) and (11) . The validity of this method will be verified in the subsequent experiments.
2) RANKING OF NODES BASED ON VARIATION
The problem of the calculation burden of CA is addressed in Section III-B.1; the accuracy of CA for nodes is our next interest. Relative to the data itself, the variation of the data from nodes can better reflect the causal relationship between nodes. In other words, if the variation of data from one node can easily cause the variation of data from another node, the former must be the driver of the latter, and this causal relationship between nodes can be quantified by the corresponding TE value and the three indexes (DD, TD and Degree). The variation of data for each node is acquired as follows:
where S i t is the variation of the total complex power flow for the node i, and t is the sampling time. If the state estimation is based on a DC model (1), equation (13) can be simplified as the variation of the total real power flow of node i. Thus, the TE values of nodes can be acquired according to the variation of data S i t instead of S i flow , which can reflect the dynamic nature of the causality better. Then, DD, TD and Degree are calculated further to evaluate the significance of nodes, which is important for adversaries to select the optimal attacked nodes.
C. NODE ATTACK
Before the introduction of the node attack, we make the following assumptions to describe our attack scenario.
Assumption 2: There are two points as follows:
1) The measurement data are all eavesdropped in the form of the node by adversaries, including the injection power data of the node (bus), the power flow data of branches directly connected to the node, and even the voltage amplitude of the node.
2) The result of attacks is that the corresponding measurement data cannot be normally received by the SE, for example, the result of the DoS attack.
To show the advantage of proposed node attack, two attack modes are compared, namely, the node attack and the data attack.
Node attack: considering the low cost of adversaries, we assume that only a few critical nodes are selected as the attacked nodes based on the Degree, DD and TD of nodes. Moreover, for every critical node selected to be attacked, all measurement data are manipulated synchronously by adversaries in the node attack, including the injection power data of the node, and the corresponding power flow data from K branches directly connected to the node.
Data attack: according to Degree, DD and TD of measurement data, the significance of the data is evaluated through the CA of measurement data, and then, the data of top K measurements are manipulated by adversaries.
To ensure a fair comparison between the two attack modes, one should have the same quantity of manipulated data in the node attack and data attack; furthermore, the evaluation index for the significance of the nodes and measurement data must be the same.
Clearly, due to the attack launched on the critical measurement data set or data, the effect of the node attack or data attack must be better than that of a random attack (the attacked targets are randomly selected). However, is the effect of the node attack still better than that of the data attack? We present the following theorem as the qualitative analysis for superiority of the node attack in theory.
Theorem 1: The probability of an unobservable system caused by one single node attack is larger than that caused by a data attack, if one has the premise that the number of the manipulated data is the same in the two attack modes and DC model (1) is adopted, namely,
where P node denotes the probability of an unobservable system caused by one single node attack, and P data denotes the probability of an unobservable system caused by one time of the data attack. The nonnegative integer s 1 denotes the number of nodes with the degree equal to 1 in the grid, and 0 ≤ s 1 < n. The vector β denotes the number of critical measurement data in the data attack. Proof: The proof is given in the Appendix. Remark 5: According to the theorem above, even if one node is attacked, which can lead to the corresponding column having all zero values of the Jacobian matrix H , the system must lose the observability. However, attacking the same quantity of distributed measurement data based on their TE values may be insufficient to make the system unobservable. Therefore, the theorem above indicates that the effect of the node attack is more powerful than that of the data attack. Moreover, the theorem also provides the theoretical basis for the optimal node attack proposed in this paper.
D. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OPTIMAL NODE ATTACK
In summary, combined with different attack types, the proposed attack strategy for deteriorating state estimation is implemented according to the following algorithm:
Algorithm 1 Optimal Attacked Node
Input: The measurement data z (z are all eavesdropped in the form of nodes (sensor groups) by adversaries over a period of time) Output: DD vector, TD vector, Degree vector, the serial number of the optimal attacked node 1: initialize: t, l and h. 2: the pre-fusion of the measurement data z from each node is completed according to (12) before the CA. 3: the variation of pre-fused data for each node is acquired by (13). 4: the causality analyses based on TE between nodes (sensor groups) by (8) are implemented. 5: according to the TE values, the corresponding DD, TD and Degree values of nodes are calculated through (9), (10) and (11). 6: the significance of nodes are evaluated by ranking of nodes based on the corresponding DD, TD and Degree values, through which the optimal attacked nodes are selected due to the large values of corresponding indexes in the ranking.
Finally, a type of attack is launched for the optimal attacked node, such as a DoS attack, which can lead to the unobservable system according to Theorem 1 and degrade the effect of the SE, where the contaminated measurement process under DoS attack in [10] is adopted. VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. IEEE 6-bus power system.
IV. CASE STUDIES IN THE SMART GRID
First, to show the effect of our proposed attack in detail, a power system with fewer nodes (such as the IEEE 6-bus power system including 6 nodes and 11 branches and 3 generators) is introduced; the topological structure is shown in Fig.2 . The measurement data are generated by MATPOWER [30] . There are 11 power flow data points can be transmitted to the state estimator under no attack, namely, P 12 , P 14 , P 15 , P 23 , P 24 , P 25 , P 26 , P 35 , P 36 , P 45 , P 56 . The parameters in CA are l = 8 and h = 1. Moreover, t = 40, i.e., 40 measurement data points are collected during the observation period. Second, in Section IV-C, a larger power system such as the IEEE 39-bus is introduced to confirm the superiority of the proposed attack.
Note that the number allocation can help the blind adversaries to identify and process different data or data set, which is always different from the true number allocation by defenders. However, to verify the effect of the proposed node attack, the true number allocation of nodes and measurement data by defenders is used to describe specific attack scenarios in all figures and tables.
A. SELECTION OF THE OPTIMAL ATTACKED TARGETS
First, we adopt the method presented in [22] , including the mean and variance tests to access the stationarity of the measurement data over 40 sampling time points (t = 40), where the setting of parameters is the same as that in [22] . The results of causality analyses on TE values for the data are displayed in Fig.3 and Fig.4 . The significance of nodes (sensor groups) on pre-fused measurement data or the variation of pre-fused measurement data is evaluated and shown in Fig.3 , while the significance of measurement data (sensors) on raw measurement data or the variation of raw measurement data is evaluated and shown in Fig.4 . According to the CA on the pre-fused measurement data in Fig.3(a) , node 5 is the most critical node because its sum of TE values is the maximal one. From the CA on the variation of the pre-fused data shown in Fig.3(b) , however, node 2 is the most critical node. As for Fig.4 , since the amount of measurement data is larger, it is challenging to identify the critical data. Therefore, quantitative analyses on DD, TD and Degree are implemented to identify the critical node and measurement data, namely, the ranking of nodes and data on these indexes, which are shown in Table 1 and Table 2 .
In Table 1 , according to DD, TD and Degree for Fig.3(a) , nodes 5, 6 and 5 are evaluated and identified as the most critical nodes. However, according to DD, TD and Degree, the CA in Fig.3(b) is based on the variation of the pre-fused (measurement) data, and nodes 2, 5 and 5 are identified as the most critical nodes. Clearly, the result of the CA based on the variation of the pre-fused data (DD, TD and Degree for Fig.3(b) ) is closer to the topological structure shown in Fig.2 , which indicates the effect of the improvement as described in Section III-B.2. In addition, the most critical nodes are highlighted in bold in Table 1 .
In summary, from the last three columns of Table 1 , nodes 2 and 5 are the most critical nodes according to their DD, TD and Degree values, and both of them have 5 directly connected branches. Therefore, according to DD, TD and Degree in Fig.4 , the data from 5 branches should be identified as the critical data in Table 2 ; note that the number of critical data highlighted in bold is ensured to be consistent with the number of branches directly connected to the most critical node in Table 1 . For example, based on the DC model, if node 5 is identified as the most critical node based on its Degree value in Fig.3(b) and Table 1 , there are 5 power flow data points from directly connected branches to be attacked in the node attack. Therefore, the data from 5 branches should be identified as the critical data in Table 2 and would be attacked by adversaries.
In addition, the critical data evaluated on raw measurement data and variation of measurement data should be compared and analyzed. According to Fig.4(a) and Table 2 , the sets of the critical data are {1 → 2, 1 → 4, 2 → 3, 3 → 5, 5 → 6} on DD values, {1 → 5, 2 → 6, 3 → 5, 3 → 6, 4 → 5} on TD values and {1 → 5, 2 → 3, 3 → 5, 3 → 6, 4 → 5} on Degree values. Therefore, nodes 1, 5 and 5 can be identified as the most critical nodes based on their frequency as the driver in the first set, the frequency as target in the second set and Degree values in the third set, respectively. Similarly, nodes 2, 5 and 2 can be identified as the most critical nodes according to Fig.4(b) and Table 2 , which indicates that the CA based on the variation of raw measurement data in Fig.4(b) is closer to the topology structure shown in Fig.2 .
According to Theorem 1, once the node attack occurs, the system loses observability. Therefore, relative to the data attack, the node attack has better attack effects (regarding observability) and lower computation of the CA due to the data prefusion in the experiments and analyses above. In addition, the effect of the data attack is only minimally evaluated due to the different identified critical data. Therefore, we show the error of state estimations under the two attack modes.
B. STATE ESTIMATION UNDER THE COMBINATION OF THE TWO ATTACK MODES AND DOS
To ensure the operation of the SE, the last received measurement data have to be maintained by the SE once DoS attack occurs. Due to the better performance of CA for Fig.3(b) and Fig.4(b) rather than Fig.3(a) and Fig.4(a) , the optimal attacked node in node attack is determined according to Fig.3(b) while the set of attacked measurement data in the data attack is determined according to Fig.4(b) . Therefore, nodes 2, 5 and 5 are selected as the optimal attacked node according to their DD, TD and Degree values in the node attack, while the three sets of measurement data for Fig.4(b) in Table 2 are selected to be optimal attacked data according to their DD, TD and Degree values in the data attack. There are 5 cases in the experiment, including no attack (case 1), node 2 being attacked (case 2), node 5 being attacked (case 3), and data attacks (case 4 and case 5), which are illustrated in Table 3 , where the fourth column of Table 3 denotes the evaluation index of optimal attacked targets. Then, the corresponding effects of the SE under the two attack modes are displayed in Fig.5 and Fig.6 . We assume the attacks are launched continuously from sampling time points 20 to 40.
According to Fig.5 , case 2 leads to the maximal error of SE among the 5 cases, which is verified further in Fig.6 . Through the calculation of the 2-norm and mean values for errors of the SE in Fig.6 , we find that the first and best choice of the attacked node is node 2 (on the DD value in case 2). Case 4 is the second choice since the attacked measurement data selected based on the DD or Degree value are closer to the attacked measurement data in case 2. However, due to the selection of the optimal attacked data based on the TD values, the errors of the SE caused by the attacks in case 3 and 5 are smaller. Clearly, the impact of the data attack in case 5 on SE is almost 0 since the TD values of the attacked measurement data are the largest and sources of these data are dispersed in space. In other words, according to the results of the above analyses, the index DD is the most important index among the three indexes, whereas the index TD is meaningless. In addition, according to the same evaluation index for optimal attacked targets in Table 3 , node attacks have a better attack effect than data attacks, which result in the larger error of the SE as shown in Fig.5 and Fig.6 .
Note that the attack in case 5 can be regarded as the random attack, in which the attacked targets are not optimal. Clearly, the sustained DoS attack in case 5 has hardly any impact on the system.
C. OTHER LARGER POWER SYSTEM
The IEEE 6-bus power system is a small-scale system that is insufficient to verify the effect of the proposed attack strategy; therefore, the proposed attack strategy is applied to a larger power system such as the IEEE 39-bus to verify the superiority of this node attack. The measurement data of the IEEE 39-bus power system (including 39 nodes and 46 branches and 10 generators) are also generated by MATPOWER [30] . There are 46 power flow data points in the form of node packets that can be transmitted to the state estimator under no attack. We assume that the measurement data over 100 sampling times (t = 100) are intercepted through the communication network by adversaries. The parameters in CA are l = 7 and h = 1.
For the optimal node attack, let Node DD corresponds to the case that the optimal attacked nodes are selected according to the index DD, Node Degree corresponds to the case that the optimal attacked nodes are selected according to the index Degree and Node TD corresponds to the case that the optimal attacked nodes are selected according to the index TD. Thus, the mean values of errors for SE under node attack can be shown in Fig.7 , where the number of attacked nodes is increased from 1 to 10 one by one (i.e., the number of attacked nodes for the first attack is 1, then 2 for the second attack, and so on). When the number of attacked nodes is 10, the mean values of errors for SE in the three cases are also tagged out in Fig.7, namely, 3 .118, 2.572 and 1.915 respectively. Similarly, for the data attack, let Data DD corresponds to the case that the optimal attacked (measurement) data are selected according to the index DD, Data Degree corresponds to the case that the optimal attacked data are selected according to the index Degree and Data TD corresponds to the case that the optimal attacked data are selected according to the index TD. Thus, the mean values of errors for SE under data attack can be shown in Fig.8 , where the number of attacked data is increased from 3 to 30 and the interval is also 3. Note that the corresponding maximum number of the attacked measurement data in the node attack is 26 (when the number of attacked critical nodes is 10), which is less than the maximum number (30) of the attacked measurement data in the data attack. Let N n denotes the number of attacked nodes in the node attack, and N d denotes the number of attacked measurement data in the data attack. Thus, we enumerate the mean values of errors for SE in Table 4 , when N n = 1 and N n = 10 in the three cases of the proposed node attack, while N d = 3 and N d = 30 in the three cases of the data attack. According to Fig.8 and Table 4 , when the number of attacked data is 30, the mean values of errors for SE in the three cases are 2.287, 2 and 1.732 respectively.
According to Fig.7 , Fig.8 and Table 4 , the mean values of errors for SE are small and close to the mean value of errors under no attack (0.3961) when very few nodes or measurement data are attacked. With the increase of attacked targets, the mean values of errors for SE become larger and larger in all cases of Fig.7 and Fig.8 . However, when the critical attacked targets are selected according to the same indexes, the effects of node attacks ( Fig.7) are obviously better than that of data attacks (Fig.8) , which lend to the larger errors for SE. For instance, the mean values of errors for SE from Node DD are larger than that from Data DD , and the same situation exists between Node Degree and Data Degree , Node TD and Data TD . In addition, we reach the similar experimental conclusion to the Section IV-B, namely, among the three proposed evaluation indexes for the significance of nodes or data in the grid, the new index DD is the most important and the index Degree is the second important in most scenarios, the order is reversed by accident. Clearly, attacking the critical nodes or data selected according to the index DD can cause larger errors of the SE even if the adversaries are blind to the system topology, which is dangerous for system defenders. Here, both of Node TD in the node attack and Data TD in the data attack can be considered as the random attack, since the index TD lacks authority for the significance of nodes or data.
It should be noted that the optimal node attacks in Fig.7 do not cause the system to collapse even when the 10 most critical nodes are attacked, since we do not further study the impact of the wrong control instructions generated by EMS on physical system, but only the impact of attacks on state estimation. In addition, state estimator adopts the last received measurement data (or the last uncontaminated data) to ensure the operation of SE once the attacks are detected in the experiment above. Clearly, the errors of the SE are slowly increasing if there is no large change of states in the physical system. Nevertheless, the validity and superiority of the proposed optimal node attack rather than data attack and random attack can be verified in this paper.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In the paper, a new optimal node attack against state estimation in CPS is presented, which is a blind attack since the topology information and parameters of the system are unavailable to adversaries. The optimal attack can be launched only on the causality analysis (CA) for transmitted measurement data of each node, namely, a kind of datadriven attack, where the measurement data are preprocessed to reduce the calculation burden before the CA. In addition, the proposed node attack is proven to be more destructive than the data attack through theoretical analyses and experiments, which offers not only a new way to calculate the TE values between sensor groups but also three new evaluating indexes for the significance of nodes or data. The case studies of node and data attacks against state estimation in the smart grid indicate that the node attack is superior to random attack in attack effect. In particular, the proposed node attack is also superior to data attack in calculation, analyses and attack effect. In addition, the DD values of nodes or raw measurement data are the most important index to evaluate their significance in the grid for adversaries, and the Degree values are the second, but TD values tend to be less important. Therefore, the selection of optimal attacked targets according to the optimal index is the most critical work for adversaries no matter what type of attacks they adopt.
The proposed attack can be launched to not only the smart grid but also other CPS, for example, Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) in the chemical industry and the transportation and water conservancy systems. In summary, the great power of adversaries is verified in the paper although adversaries are blind, which is an enormous threat for the defenders of CPS and could force the upgrading of the technology in cyber-security of CPS. However, there are still possibilities for improvement in the proposed attack: the proposed attack based on the linear CA could be weaker or invalid for strongly nonlinear data, which should be improved by suitable nonlinear methods; furthermore, perhaps some trigger mechanisms [31] based on the change of states can be introduced to improve the proposed attack; moreover, as in [26] , the impact of the manipulated cyber system on physical system deserves further study, due to the false control instructions induced by the false estimated states; in addition, combined with our proposed optimal attacked targets, if the cyber-attack is stealth, the corresponding optimal attack should be more powerful than un-stealth attack, which requires further experimental verification in future work.
APPENDIX
Proof of the Theorem 1: Note that the topological structure is an objective existence; hence, the degree, out-degree and in-degree in graph theory can be used to prove the conclusion of the theorem. To simplify the observation analysis of the system, we assume that the reactance X ij ≡ 2 for all the branches and that the SE can receive the measurement data under no attack. Let k 1 and k 2 denote the out-degree and in-degree of the node i, respectively. Thus, the i th column of the H has the following nonzero elements according to [23, eqs. (1) and (2) Otherwise, all the other elements of the i th column are 0. Clearly, the scenario a) has the maximum number of nonzero elements, namely, (1+k 1 +k 2 + b) = (1 + d i + b), where d i is the degree of the node i. Note that the system is not attacked, i.e., observable (assuming that there is no packet loss) as long as the H is always a full column rank matrix.
On the one hand, once node i is identified as the most critical node and attacked by adversaries, all of the corresponding β measurement data of the node i cannot be received by SE. Therefore, all elements in the i th column of the H are zero under this scenario, which means that the matrix H is no longer a full column rank matrix, and the system loses observability. In other words, P node =1.
On the other hand, when an optimal data attack is adopted by adversaries, in which the same number of measurement data as that in node attack is manipulated, we can acquire the upper bound of P data easily, namely, P data ≤ 1 when the most critical measurement data are directly related to the same node or contain the data from all sensors directly related to one node.
Then, we analyze the lower bound of the probability P data . For example, when the (k 1 + k 2 ) most critical power data are directly related to (k 1 + k 2 ) different nodes, the matrix H has the lowest probability of a column with all zero elements. Therefore, the value of the P data is the lowest under this situation. Thus, we have the following analyses for the lower bound: i) if s 1 = 0, the critical power data are derived from branches of completely different nodes, and the system must be observable due to the full column rank matrix H , namely, P data = 0; ii) if s 1 = 0, the lower bound of P data is still P data = 0 when the completely different nodes are all nodes with the degree> 1; and iii) if s 1 = 0 and P data = 0, the nonzero lower bound of P data is as follows:
Therefore, sgn (s 1 ) sgn (P data ) s 1 β n ≤ P data ≤ P node = 1. 
